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I. INTRODUCTION

The Trump Administration's rhetoric and increased immigration
enforcement actions have raised the level of fear in immigrant
communities. The increased enforcement has included having United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents appear at
state and local courthouses to detain undocumented immigrants when
they arrive for court.' This enforcement tactic has had a chilling effect
on the prosecution of domestic violence, as undocumented victims
wish to avert encountering ICE agents at the courthouse. 2 In El Paso,
for example, ICE agents detained a woman who was bringing a case
* Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. Many thanks
to my research assistant, Taylor Bui, and Professor Dawinder Sidhu.
1. See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Immigrationand the Bully Pulpi 130 HARv. L. REV. F. 243,
267 (2017).
2. Heidi Glen, Fearof Deportation Spurs 4 Women to Drop Domestic Abuse Cases in
Denver, NPR (March 21, 2017, 4:43 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/03/21/520841332/fear-ofdeportation-spurs-4-women-to-drop-domestic-abuse-cases-in-denver.
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of domestic violence against her abuser. There were claims that ICE
was tipped off about the victim's immigration status by her alleged
abuser.3
The direct effect of the presence of federal ICE agents at state
and local courthouses extends beyond the victims of domestic
violence. It also hampers the ability of state and municipalities to
enforce their domestic violence laws. This interference, in turn,
undermines state sovereignty and the exercise of the states' police
power, both of which are critical in our federalist system.
This Article argues that the ICE initiative to detain
undocumented individuals at state and local courthouses runs afoul of
the constitutional limits on federal action, as made clear by United
States v. Lopez4 and United States v. Morrison5 and, to a lesser
extent, other Tenth Amendment cases that robustly protect state
police powers and that have set forth a reinvigorated sense of the
state's role in our federalism. Accordingly, under the revived notion
of state sovereignty and police power in our federalism structure, ICE
should be kept away from the state and local courthouses.
II. REVIVED FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES HAVE STRENGTHENED STATES'
POLICE POWERS AGAINST FEDERAL ENCROACHMENT.

A. Lopez and Morrison re-drew the lines between federal and
state sovereignty.
In 1995, the Supreme Court signaled a shift in its approach to
federalism in the context of its Commerce Clause jurisprudence. At
issue in Lopez was the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which
made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause
to believe, is a school zone." 6 Reversing the tide of Supreme Court
opinion that had flowed since NL.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,7 United States v. Darby, and Wickard v. Filbum,9 the Court
3. Marty Schladen, ICE Detains Alleged Domestic Violence Victim, EL PASO TIMES
(Feb. 15, 2017, 3:49 PM), http://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/2017/02/15/ice-detainsdomestic-violence-victim-court/97965624/.
4. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
5. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
6. 514 U.S. at 551 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012)).
7. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
8. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). For example, the Court in Darbynoted that:
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held that the Act was not a proper exercise of Congress's Commerce
Clause power. In doing so, the Court revived the importance of state
sovereignty and, in particular, the ability of states to exercise their
police powers without federal interference, principles that the
majority of the Court found (and continues to find) embedded in the
Tenth Amendment.
We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a federal
government of enumerated powers. As James Madison wrote:

-

The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to
the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite.lo
The Court emphasized the importance of "meaningful limits" on
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause." Those limits are
pressed when "national power seeks to intrude upon an area of
traditional state concern." 1 2 The line in Lopez was easy to draw, "for
it is well established that education is a traditional concern of the
States." 1 3 The Court reiterated that, in such cases, it possesses a
"particular duty to ensure that the federal-state balance is not
destroyed."l 4 The need for the states to retain flexibility to address
such complex issues was highlighted by the Court: "If a State or
municipality determines that harsh criminal sanctions are necessary
and wise to deter students from carrying guns on school premises, the
reserved powers of the States are sufficient to enact those

Such regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state power merely because
either its motive or its consequence is to restrict the use of articles of
commerce within the states of destination; and is not prohibited unless by
other Constitutional provisions. It is no objection to the assertion of the
power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the
same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the states.
Id. at 114.
9. 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
10. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
11. Id.at580.
12. Id
13. Id. at 580 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974); see also
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
14. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581.
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measures." 15 The Court has repeatedly emphasized this flexibility
(i.e., preserving the ability of states to serve as "laboratories"). 16
Mornson involved Congress's creation of a civil cause of action
for damages resulting from gender-motivated crimes under the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994.17 In striking down the
provision, the Court emphasized that regulation of such crimes falls
soundly within the state's police powers. The Court "accordingly
reject[s] the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic,
violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate
effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local."' 8

The Court noted that it could "think of no better example of the
police power, which the Founders denied the National Government
and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and
vindication of its victims." 9 The Court further explained that even the
Fourteenth Amendment, which was drafted to address bad behavior
by the states, contains limitations to protect against undue federal
intrusion into the arena of state police powers. 20 The Court noted that
"[t]hese limitations are necessary to prevent the Fourteenth
Amendment from obliterating the Framers' carefully crafted balance
of power between the States and the National Government."21
As Professor Lash has explained, Lopez and Morrison signaled a
significant resurgence of a "narrow construction of federal power to
interfere with matters believed best left under state control." 2 2
Relying on James Madison's Report of 1800, Lash has argued that

15. Id.
16. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2673 (2015) (acknowledging that the Court has recognized the role of states as laboratories for
solving complex legal problems); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
17. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
18. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, at 617 (2000).
19. Id at 618.
20. Id. at 661 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 621; see also McCarthy v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 433 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Title
II of the ADA is not permissible Commerce Clause legislation to the extent that it regulates
states' decisions regarding who will participate in or receive the benefits of state entitlement
programs.").
22. Kurt T. Lash, James Madison's CelebratedReport of 1800: The Transformation of
the Tenth Amendment 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 165, 165 (2006).
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following the Rehnquist Court's rulings, jurisprudence is returning to
the original, 1800 understanding of the Tenth Amendment. 23
In split opinions, a majority of the Court re-affirmed this
approach to federalism in the challenge to the Affordable Care Act in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. 2 4

In his

opinion, Chief Justice Roberts explained:
The States thus can and do perform many of the vital
functions of modern government-punishing street
crime, running public schools, and zoning property for
development, to name but a few-even though the
Constitution's text does not authorize any government
to do so. Our cases refer to this general power of
governing, possessed by the States but not by the
Federal Government, as the "police power. 25

Because the police power is controlled by 50 different
States instead of one national sovereign, the facets of
governing that touch on citizens' daily lives are
normally administered by smaller governments closer
to the governed. The Framers thus ensured that
powers which "in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people" were held by governments more local and
more accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy. 26
In refusing to extend the Commerce Clause to cover the passage
of the Affordable Care Act, the Court emphasized that "[a]ny police
power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to their activities,
remains vested in the States."2 7
23. Id. In contrast, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that the holdings in those cases
are founded upon "unsupported assumptions" and that overcoming those basic assumptions is
the role of the Courts and the Tenth Amendment to develop a true understanding of federalism.
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions ofFederalism, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1763, 1764 (2006).
24. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
25. Id. at 536.
26. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
27. Id. at 557.
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Thus, steadily since 1995, the Court has revived the importance
of protecting state police power and insuring that it remains free of
federal interference. Although this revival has occurred within the
context of Commerce Clause cases, there can be little doubt that
protecting the police power of the states remains of paramount
importance to the Court.
III. WHY STATE COURTHOUSES MUST BE OFF-LIMITS

Traditionally, one of the most important exercises of state police
powers has been the adjudication of misdemeanor crimes and, in
particular, domestic violence. Various scholars and organizations
have documented the effect of immigration enforcement on domestic
violence victims. This Part explains why the interference of ICE
agents at state and local courthouses intrudes in the area of state
sovereignty, as protected by the Supreme Court under its Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence.
ICE enforcement policies have resulted in declining reports for
sexual assaults and domestic violence, particularly in Spanishspeaking, Latino communities. 28 The heads of some state high courts
have expressed concern (in ways that echo the United States Supreme
Court) about state sovereignty and police power in the context of ICE
enforcement and undocumented victims. Chief Justice Stuart Rabner
of New Jersey, for example, criticized the United States Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and ICE immigration enforcement
policies at state courthouses. 2 9 Chief Justice Rabner argued that these
arrests and searches undermine the courts' functions and the legal
system. 30 He touched upon how it directly impacts domestic violence
cases and requested that courthouses be listed in DHS's list of
"sensitive locations." 31 Chief Justice Mary Fairhurst of Washington

28. Dean DeChairo, Democrats Want Congress to Limit ICE Enforcement at Sensitive
Locations, CONG. Q. ROLL CALL, June 5, 2017, at 1, 2017 WL 2415384.
29. Letter from Stuart Rabner, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of N.J., to John F. Kelly,
Sec'y of Homeland Sec., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. (April 19, 2017), http://2hqyh93y2sj32
lqbnw40aojO.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/00069527.pdf
3 0. Id
31. ICE has promulgated a policy that limits enforcements actions at "sensitive
locations" such as churches and schools. Memorandum from Jon Morton, Dir., U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enf't (Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ero-outreach
/pdf/1 0029.2-policy.pdf.
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also sent a letter to then-DHS Secretary John Kelly arguing that ICE
enforcement at state court houses is directly impacting due process. 32
More broadly, Professor Vishnuvajjala has articulated how ICE's
"Secure Communities" policies have a disproportionate impact on
battered women in immigrant communities. 33 She explained why
victims in immigrant communities are already vulnerable to domestic
violence due to social, linguistic, and cultural barriers. 34 Further, the
cooperative relationships between local law enforcement and ICE
directly compounds the problem by bringing federal immigration
enforcement to the local level, discouraging these victims from
coming forward.

5

Civil rights activists and organizations have also explained in
detail why immigration enforcement at state courthouses affects local
law enforcement. 36 The common thread in these pieces is that ICE
enforcement causes increased fear, which results in under-reporting
and a failure to appear for court. This all results in a lack of state
enforcement of domestic violence laws and thus results in increased
32. Washington State Chieflustice Objects to Immigration Enforcement Tactics at State
Courthouses, 94 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1, 6 (March 27, 2017).
33. Radha Vishnuvajjala, Insecure Communities: How an Immigration Enforcement
ProgramEncouragesBattered Women to Stay Silent, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 185 (2012).
34. Id.
35. Id. Christina Carr has also addressed the impact immigration enforcement has on
survivors of domestic violence and sexual assaults. Christina Carr, Advocates: FemaleAbuse
Victims Need More Help, CONG. Q. ROLL CALL, Sept. 23, 2014, at 1, 2014 WL 4723862. She
did so by analyzing the structural components of immigration enforcement policies that fail to
provide support for those survivors. Id The lack of appropriate counseling limits the
survivors' ability to access mental health services, petition for asylum, and may in fact,
compound trauma. Id
36. See Thirteen OrganizationsCall on Top State Officials to Protect RI Immigrants,
ACLU OF R.I. (May 9, 2017), http://www.riaclu.org/news/post/thirteen-organizations-call-ontop-state-officials-to-protect-ri-immigrants; Joanne Lin, Immigration Arrests at State
Courthouses Rise in 2017. Here's Why That's Dangerous-ForAll of Us, ACLU: SPEAK
FREELY (April 6, 2017, 2:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-andNational
LGBTQ
border-patrol-abuses/immigration-arrests-state-courthouses-are-rise;
Organizations Denounce Arrest of Transgender Survivor of Domestic Violence by ICE El
Paso, EL PASO HERALD-POST (Feb. 16, 2017), https://elpasoheraldpost.com/1gbtq-orgsdenounce-transgender-ice-arrest/; Katie McDonough, Here's the Chilling Effect When ICE
Targets Domestic Violence Victims, SPLINTER (Feb. 16, 2017, 2:58 PM), https://fusion.kinja
.com/heres-the-chilling-effect-when-ice-targets-domestic-vio-1793858690 (analyzing how ICE
at state court houses are driving down domestic violence reports and resulting in increased
fear); Review ofFeb. 20, 2017 DHS Memoranda: PossibleImpacts on Survivors ofDomestic
and Sexual Violence, 2017 TAHIRIH JUSTICE CENTER 3, http://www.ncdsv.org/TJCReviewof-February-20-2017-DHS-Memoranda_2-21-2017.pdf (explaining how the new DHS
enforcement policies would directly hinder and discourage domestic and sexual violence
survivors from reporting their claims).
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crime. This is exactly the type of federal interference that was at the
heart of cases like Lopez and Morrison.

IV. ICE PRESENCE IS TANTAMOUNT

TO COMMANDEERING OF THE
STATE JUDICIAL PROCESSES

In addition to the renewed focus on state sovereignty and
federalism adopted by the Court in Lopez and Morison, other cases
have strengthened these principles by relying on the Tenth
Amendment. New York v. United StatS37 and Pnntz v. United
States38 both addressed the limit of federal regulation of states. In
those cases, the Supreme Court held that the federal government
could not commandeer the legislative and executive arms of the
states. 39 To do so violates the notion of dual sovereignty built into our
federalist system. 40 Although not precisely on point to the topic at

37. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
38. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).
39. The Court in New York explained that:
A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques
is no choice at all. Either way, "the Act commandeers the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program," an outcome that has never been understood
to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution.
505 U.S. at 176. The Court in Pnntzexplained that:
We adhere to that principle today, and conclude categorically, as we
concluded categorically in New York: "The Federal Government may not
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program." The mandatory obligation imposed on CLEOs to perform
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers plainly runs afoul
of that rule.
521 U.S. at 933 (internal citation omitted).
40. The Court in New York explained that:
If a state official is faced with the same set of alternatives-choosing a
location or having Congress direct the choice of a location-the state
official may also prefer the latter, as it may permit the avoidance of
personal responsibility. The interests of public officials thus may not
coincide with the Constitution's intergovernmental allocation of
authority. Where state officials purport to submit to the direction of
Congress in this manner, federalism is hardly being advanced.
505 U.S. at 182-83. The Court in Pantznoted that:
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hand, it informs the Court's increasingly bright-line approach to
demarcating the boundary between federal and state sovereignty.
Permitting ICE agents to appear and to detain immigrants at state
and local courthouses is tantamount to commandeering the state
police power to do the bidding of federal law. Commandeering of the
legislative and executive arms of the states was soundly rejected as a
violation of Tenth Amendment principles in New York v. US. and
Printz v. US. In New York, Congress was deemed to have unlawfully
commandeered the legislative arms of the state by requiring the states
to implement a federal program or to "take title" of low-level
radioactive waste.4 1 In Prmntz, local chief law enforcement officers
were required by federal law to run background checks. As in New
York, the federal government was found to have unlawfully
commandeered the executive arms of the states.42
By allowing state and local courthouses to serve as a "round-up"
point for undocumented immigrants who are compelled to be present
to testify in state or local prosecutions, ICE is, in essence,
commandeering the state judicial process and the states' exercise of
their police power. This affront to federalism is worsened by the
reality that ICE's presence at state and local courthouses undermines
the ability of states to enforce their laws at those courthouses.
Specifically, in the context of immigration, the federal courts
have made clear that direct commandeering of state and local officials
to do federal bidding runs afoul of federalism principles. "Under the
Tenth Amendment, immigration officials may not order state and
local officials to imprison suspected aliens subject to removal at the

The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States
to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those
of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and
no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system
of dual sovereignty.
521 U.S. at 935.
41. New York, 505 U.S. at 175-76.
42. "Under the Tenth Amendment, federal officers may not conscript or commandeer
state officials into administering and enforcing a federal regulatory program." United States v.
White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1127 (10th Cir. 2015).
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request of the federal government." 4 3 The Third Circuit went on to
explain as follows:
As we have previously recognized, "all powers not
explicitly conferred to the federal government are
reserved to the states, a maxim reflected in the text of
the Tenth Amendment." It follows that "any law that
commandeers the legislative processes [and agencies]
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program is beyond the
inherent limitations on federal power within our dual
system." In other words, a conclusion that a detainer
issued by a federal agency is an order that state and
local agencies are compelled to follow, is inconsistent
with the anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth
Amendment.

As in New York and Printz, immigration officials may
not compel state and local agencies to expend funds
and resources to effectuate a federal regulatory
scheme.44
Indeed, the seminal immigration case of recent years, Arizona v.
United States, underscores the need to clearly demarcate the lines of
dual sovereignty. 4 5 "Federalism, central to the constitutional design,
adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments
have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect., 4 6
43. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014).
44. Id at 643-44 (internal citations omitted).
45. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
46. Id at 398. As Professor Gerken has argued, the strengthening of the Tenth
Amendment represents the new nationalism. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New
Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L. J. 1889 (2014). She argues that as federalism grows,
states will begin to be used to accomplishing national goals. Id. Professor Jennifer Chac6n has
argued that the coercive funding strategies by Congress violate the Tenth Amendment. See
Chac6n, supra note 1. Bill Ong Hing has analyzed how sanctuary polices fall within reserved
police powers of the state. Bill Ong Hing, ImmgrationSanctuary Policies: Constitutionaland
Representative of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247 (2012).
Relatedly, Shirley Lin has also argued that "[t]he REAL ID Act requires states to implement
the sheer majority of its regulatory scheme, also arguably in violation of the Tenth
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V. CONCLUSION

If state police power is to mean anything, it must mean the
ability of state and local entities to enforce laws against domestic
violence without federal interference. Even in areas where Congress
has enumerated authority, such as, commerce and immigration, there
must be a stopping point that protects the states in our federalism
structure. As members of the Court have repeatedly emphasized, it is
the states that need the ability to protect their citizens from such
criminal acts, free from federal interference. ICE's overreach
undermines this ability and threatens the boundaries that set apart the
dual sovereigns in our federalism.

Amendment." Shirley Lin, States of Resistance: The Real ID Act and Constitutional Limits
Upon FederalDeputization ofState Agencies in the Regulation ofNon-Citizens, 12 N.Y. CITY
L. REV. 329, 351 (2009).
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